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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRMS AND THEIR LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 
THE ROLE OF CULTURAL CONSONANCE 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this study, we seek to reconcile diverging dominant views on the relationship between firms and their 
legal environment by offering a cultural contingency perspective. We begin by accepting the notion that a 
new law will likely exert a powerful influence on targeted firms and that firms’ strategic responses 
include efforts to shape the impact of the new law. However, we suggest that the success of such response 
will be contingent on the degree of cultural consonance of firms’ strategic responses and the dominant 
cultural context at that time. We elaborate this view in our detailed qualitative and quantitative analyses 
of the automotive Safety Act of 1966 and the response by targeted firms. We provide evidence showing 
that the changes in the degree of cultural consonance of firms’ strategic response and the predominant 
cultural beliefs/values explain both the early failure of firms’ efforts to shape the impact of the law in the 
mid-1960s and the later success by the end of the 1970s. We highlight how firms’ cultural context 
provides both a constraint and an opportunity for firms seeking to shape legal environmental pressures, 
and we conclude by discussing the implications of our dynamic contingency perspective for research on 
law, culture, and strategy.    
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How a new law is likely to influence – and be potentially influenced by – firms is one of the 
central questions of organizational theory (Selznick et al. 1969, Short and Toffel 2007, Sine and Lee 
2009, Sutton et al. 1994). Evidence of the impact of new laws on business is significant. For example, 
research has shown that new legislation contributed to the rise of internal labor markets (Baron et al. 
1986), spurred the development of large corporations (Roy 1997), influenced the adoption of new 
management models (Guillén 1994, Kalev et al. 2008), and created novel market opportunities (Hiatt et 
al. 2009, Sine et al. 2005). A new law not only sets the rules of the game for its target firms, or industries, 
but also represents the structural incarnation of cultural beliefs, values, and norms (Baron et al. 1986) that, 
for example, define myths and expectations about consumption (Rao 1998), the competitive environment 
(Sine and Lee 2009), or people’s equality at work (Dobbin 2009).  
Organizational theorists have analyzed the relationship between the legal environment and firms 
from the standpoint of two (largely opposing) perspectives that can be labeled as the compliance versus 
the capture perspective. The compliance perspective, which blends insights from institutional theory and 
the sociology of law, brings attention to the coercive power of legal mandates (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). Once a new law has passed, the State can simply impose compliance on other subordinate societal 
entities (Steinmetz 1999, p. 8) because of its redistributive capacities and formal authority (Tilly 1992). 
This perspective views firms as needing to comply with new legal mandates to maintain legitimacy in 
their environment (Mizruchi and Fein 1999, Scott 2008), with compliance requirements motivating 
organizational responses that can range from substantive (Edelman and Petterson 1999, Sine et al. 2005) 
to symbolic or ceremonial (Huising and Silbey 2011, Kellogg 2009). In other words, the compliance 
perspective has generally conceptualized the legal environment as exerting significant coercive and/or 
normative pressure on firms.  
In contrast, the capture perspective, found in research in sociology, strategy, and economics, de-
emphasizes the power of legal constraints and instead highlights how firms, through their control of 
extensive economic resources, essentially “capture” the political process in favor of business interests 
(Burris 2001, Domhoff 1998, Kolko 1963) through lobbying, campaign contributions, and legal action 
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(De Figueiredo 2009, Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2014, Mizruchi 1992, Shaffer et al. 2000). This 
perspective personalizes legal and regulatory forces, focusing on the exchange between politicians 
(seeking resources and votes that powerful business firms can provide) and firms (seeking favorable 
policies and a privileged role in influencing rule-making; Becker and Stigler 1974, Pelzman 1976, Stigler 
1971). As a whole, the capture perspective emphasizes why firms’ material resources (Dreiling 2000) 
grant them significant power in shaping legislation and regulation to their advantage (Hiatt and Park 
2013, Ingram and Rao 2004).  
While the compliance and the capture perspectives provide a vivid contrast in their alternative 
conceptualizations of the organization/legal environment relationship, we suggest that an exclusive focus 
on either firms’ lack of power (compliance perspective) or firms’ greater power (capture perspective) 
risks advancing a view of business in the legal environment that is either over-socialized or under-
socialized (Granovetter 1985). Indeed, researchers have noted the decidedly mixed evidence on new laws’ 
influence on firms, and firms’ potential influence on such laws (Mizruchi 2004, Perrow 2005, Walker and 
Rea 2014). Even a cursory look at the past forty years of history in the U.S. provides many examples of 
powerful industries’ defeats in the legal sphere – such as the passing of landmark legislation like the 
Clean Air Act, the Tobacco Control Act, or the Motor Vehicle Safety Act – as well as of corporate 
influence over legislation (e.g. Delmas et al. 2015). Recent reviews conclude that despite evidence of 
firms’ active role in defining the rules of the game (Hiatt and Park 2013, Oreskes and Conway 2010), it is 
not clear when firms’ strategies in their legal environment are effective and what accounts for such 
effectiveness (Funk and Hirschman 2015, Walker and Rea 2014).  
In this study, we seek to offer an original contribution that reconciles the mixed empirical support 
of these two dominant, and opposing, theoretical perspectives in two ways. First, we suggest that rather 
than debating or seeking evidence for the compliance vs. capture view of relationship between firms and 
their legal environment, it is useful to reconsider this power relationship as likely undulating over time, 
whereby new laws trigger strategic responses by targeted firms, which can affect both the implementation 
of the law and possible changes in the law. Second, we also advance the notion that an important force 
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responsible for this undulation is the degree of cultural consonance between firms’ strategic responses to 
new laws and the cultural context. In other words, we address changes in the balance of power between 
these firms and their legal environment over time, and suggest that firms’ success in tipping the balance 
of power in their favor will be critically contingent on the extent to which firms’ strategic response to a 
new law is (or is not) harmonious with the cultural context at that time. Our use of the term cultural 
consonance parallels its use in anthropology (Dressler et al. 2005) to assess the extent to which an actor’s 
beliefs or behaviors mirror those that held more widely in the culture in which that actor is embedded. 
Because of its emphasis on the alignment of firms’ espoused beliefs with societal expectations (and the 
differential organizational outcomes that result when consonance is high versus low), consonance differs 
from the neighboring concept of resonance, which implies an audience’s experience of deeper personal 
connection (Giorgi 2017, p.  716) with a particular message or strategy. Our use of the term cultural 
context is intended to reflect widely-held social beliefs, myths, stories, and values at a particular historical 
juncture (Benford and Snow 2000, Giorgi and Weber 2015, Ingram and Silverman 2016), and we 
consider how cultural context also changes over time.  
The empirical context for our qualitative and quantitative analyses is the fifteen-year period 
(1965-1980) associated with the introduction and the implementation of a new U.S. law known as the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (“the Safety Act”). We selected this historical 
case because, as we will discuss, it presented a setting in which the legal environment exerted 
considerable pressure for compliance among automobile firms and, in turn, the automobile industry 
exerted pressure on governmental decision makers to limit the law’s impact by demanding the inclusion 
of cost-benefit analysis (the process by which the benefits to consumers of new safety features had to be 
assessed in light of such features’ costs to manufacturers) in the evaluation of automobile safety. We 
discuss why the shifting U.S. cultural context over this period helps explain differences in cultural 
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consonance, i.e., why firms’ effort to influence the law that initially failed in the mid-1960s later 
succeeded in shaping safety regulations1 by the end of the 1970s. 
As we discuss in detail in subsequent sections, our analysis shows that corporate influence over 
the legal environment in the automobile industry depended on the degree to which corporate efforts were 
culturally consonant with the broader cultural context in which these efforts were embedded – in 
particular, widespread beliefs and myths about the role of business in society. Despite the automobile 
industry’s extensive economic resources and connections with Congress, a profound distrust of 
corporations (Gabriel and Lang 2015) underpinned the rise of the consumer movement in the 1960s – also 
referred to as “consumerism”2 – and limited firms’ agency in shaping the new law. In the 1970s, the 
cultural context shifted away from consumerism in favor of a more positive view of business as a motor 
of economic growth and wealth – a shift further supported by widespread perceptions of deteriorating 
economic conditions (Vogel 1989), limited energy resources, and loss of U.S. competitiveness in the 
global marketplace. As the harmonization of the changing cultural context and automakers’ claims in 
support of cost-benefit analysis increased, this growing cultural consonance allowed such claims to 
resonate more positively with Congress, public opinion, and the courts. In this way, cost-benefit analysis 
attained broad acceptance, serving to effectively transform the law’s original meaning – from ensuring 
every citizen’s moral right to safety – to a pragmatic calculation of the costs and benefits associated with 
safety features (Mashaw and Harfst 1990).  
As noted above, we see our study, with its theoretical emphasis on cultural consonance and its 
detailed qualitative and quantitative findings, as providing an important contribution to the literature on 
firms in their legal environment by providing a pathway for reconciling the historically dominant and 
                                                
1 In the U.S., Congress passes national laws, also referred to as acts; after the passing of a law, its mandate is often 
carried forth by a regulatory agency, which is empowered to promulgate regulation. 
2 The term consumerism was used at the time to refer to the advocacy of the rights and interests of consumers; 
currently, the term mostly refers to an excessive preoccupation with the acquisition of consumer goods. 
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opposing compliance and capture perspectives. Our study suggests that the merit of both of these 
perspectives can be retained if one reconsiders the relationship between firms and their legal environment 
as an undulating movement of relative power over time. Moreover, we introduce the mechanism of 
cultural consonance to explain the magnitude of the undulation in this power relationship.  In the sections 
below, we begin by situating our intended contribution within the existing literature on firms and the law, 
and then discuss our empirical setting, methods, findings, theoretical insights, and implications for future 
research.  
FIRMS AND THEIR LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: COMPLIANCE OR CAPTURE? 
The Compliance Perspective 
The legal environment can significantly shape firms’ strategies, structures, and practices (e.g., 
Dobbin 2009). Given the State’s coercive power (Kalev et al. 2008), firms are expected to comply with 
the law and to pursue organizational activities in ways that avoid legal liability, often leading to 
substantial changes (Kelly and Dobbin 1999). New laws often result from activists’ struggles to pressure 
legislators to take action in favor of a particular cause (Schneiberg and Bartley 2001), such as workplace 
fairness (Edelman and Petterson 1999), customer protections (e.g., Soule and King 2006, Soule and Olzak 
2004), or the sustainable use of natural resources (Oreskes and Conway 2011). Activists have frequently 
aimed at shaping the legal environment as a way to realize significant social, economic, and cultural 
transformations because laws and regulations define rights, and regulate intra- and inter-organizational 
interactions (Van Dyke et al. 2004).  
Once a new law has passed, research has shown that firms enjoy agency only at the level of 
implementation within their organizational boundaries, as they comply along a spectrum from the purely 
symbolic to the substantive. When managers perceive regulations as obstacles to their pursuit of 
organizational objectives (Cook et al. 1983), as conflicting with their professional identities (Binder 2009, 
Rao et al. 2003), or as inconsistent with existing beliefs and norms (e.g., Edelman 1990, 1992), they may 
engage in merely symbolic compliance (Zajac and Westphal 1994). For example, in the context of 
implementing safety mandates, front-line managers often struggle to satisfy legal requirements (Huising 
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and Silbey 2011), or fail to communicate their practical knowledge to top management, hence limiting the 
chances of improving implementation (Gray and Silbey 2014). Because of these challenges, compliance 
is only loosely coupled with the law and a function of, for example, management styles and local 
organizational cultures (Gherardi and Nicolini 2002). Even within the same industry, organizations’ 
compliance may vary from substantive to symbolic, depending on employees’ interests and their 
opportunities for mobilization (Kellogg 2009). In sum, new laws and regulations do not automatically 
lead organizations to change their internal practices (e.g., Binder 2009), and within organizations, “things 
never quite work out as they ought when legislation is translated into administrative enforcement” 
(Huising and Silbey 2011, p. 17). Internal organizational processes determine how—and to what extent—
organizations actually comply with new laws. 
A related strand of studies emphasizes the ambiguity and/or incompleteness of laws (Edelman 
1992), because they identify broad and general objectives, but do not specify how to translate these legal 
objectives into practice. Consequently, when a new law is introduced, firms turn to professions—
particularly human resources and legal professions—to interpret legal mandates and to develop 
implementation processes, including hiring policies, evaluation procedures, or the creation of new 
organizational roles that signal compliance (Dobbin and Kelly 2007). Although the professions’ 
interpretations may not correctly capture the law’s original intent (Edelman 1992), research shows that 
lawyers and judges infer an organization’s compliance with the law by the mere existence of certain 
organizational procedures and structures, such as grievance or anti-harassment policies (Edelman et al. 
2011). As organizations heed the professions’ interpretations rather than legislators’ intent, the law 
becomes endogenous because it is partly defined within the arena that it seeks to regulate (Edelman et al. 
1999, Talesh 2009). For example, because the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lacked clear rules and regulations 
that could be easily converted into organizational practices, organizations relied on the interpretations of 
personnel experts, who, in the early 1970s, essentially “invented” equal opportunity programs, defining 
the practices of anti-discrimination in everyday organizational life (Dobbin 2009). 
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In sum, the compliance perspective portrays the law as a source of coercive (Hiatt and Park 2013, 
Mizruchi and Fein 1999), or at least normative (Dobbin 2009, Edelman 1992) pressure with which firms 
need to comply. Yet by focusing on legal constraints and the challenges of implementation within 
organizations, research from the compliance perspective glosses over how the balance of power between 
firms and their legal environment can be purposively tipped in favor of firms (e.g., Bonardi and Keim 
2005, Schneiberg and Bartley 2001).  
The Capture Perspective 
The capture perspective – a label that we use to indicate a broad stream of research rooted in 
economics, strategy, and sociology (for recent reviews see Dal Bo 2006, Hart 2004, Hillman et al. 2004, 
Walker and Rea 2014) – notices instead that firms can “capture” and define their legislative environment, 
especially when they unify their efforts (Burris 2001, Domhoff 1998, Kolko 1963). Firms’ power stems 
from their extensive resources, which “nullify or crowd-out the resources of other societal interests” 
(Dreiling 2000, p. 21). Capture perspective research offers significant insights into the tools (Hillman and 
Hitt 1999) that businesses can deploy to influence formal legal institutions, such as lobbying, campaign 
contributions, capture of regulatory enforcement, and legal action. Below we briefly review research on 
some key tools for firms’ agency, and then discuss their outcomes in shaping the law or its application. 
Lobbying is a well-documented tactic that firms and industry associations (Spillman 2012), such 
as the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce (Mizruchi 2013), use to secure favorable 
treatment (Hansen et al. 2005, Hansen and Mitchell 2000, Laumann and Knoke 1987), for instance, 
against labor unions, taxes, or requirements for public disclosures (Mizruchi 2013, Palmer et al. 1995, 
Vogel 1989). This political strategy can amount to a considerable expenditure for firms and trade 
associations. For example, in 2008 the U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent more than $60 million lobbying 
against climate change legislation (Delmas, Lim and Nairn-Birch 2015).  
Many empirical studies from the capture perspective have also examined firms’ campaign 
contributions (e.g., Mizruchi 1992) to PACs and super-PACs (Hadani and Schuler 2013) as financial 
incentives aimed at “buying legislation” (Milyo et al. 2000). In addition to targeting influential 
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lawmakers, firms can leverage their financial resources to create pro-corporate grassroots movements 
(Walker 2012, 2014) or engage in public opinion campaigns. For example, agri-business firms garnered 
public support for genetically modified organisms by mounting campaigns aimed at the general public to 
influence the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s approval of this technological innovation (Hiatt and Park 
2013). Further, the tobacco, chemical, and energy industries coopted a few prominent scientists’ support 
to reshape public perceptions and policy decisions about health risks and global warming (Oreskes and 
Conway 2011).  
In certain instances, firms successfully target regulatory agencies and the courts to change the 
enforcement rules rather than directing their efforts at legislatures. For example, by offering regulators 
very lucrative jobs (Etzion and Davis 2008) or building upon existing ties with regulatory officials (Rao 
and Giorgi 2006), firms can influence administrative agencies’ translation of laws into practice and 
capture the regulatory process (Carpenter and Moss 2013). Another documented pathway to favorably 
shape legal implementation is through the deployment of lawsuits and amicus curiae (Collins 2004, De 
Figueiredo 2009) that divert regulatory agencies’ resources away from rule-making. 
All of the studies referenced above highlight that firms deploy extensive resources to secure 
positive outcomes in the legal and regulatory arena (Mizruchi 2013, p. 271). No strong evidence, 
however, has shown that these political tools ensure firms’ success in influencing the legal environment. 
For instance, it is not clear whether campaign contributions can significantly affect political outcomes 
(Delmas et al. 2015, De Figueiredo 2002), especially since large corporations often hedge their bets with 
bipartisan contributions (Walker and Rea 2014). Similarly, lobbying is now considered a routine strategy 
that does not guarantee corporate players’ success in influencing policymaking (Bonardi and Keim 2005). 
In sum, a consensus is emerging among scholars that corporate expenditures such as lobbying, 
campaign contributions, legal battles, and public opinion campaigns are not definitive indicators of firms’ 
influence over their legal environment, as some question whether “the wealth generated by business alone 
is sufficient to win political battles” (Walker and Rea 2014, p. 284). As a result, prominent scholars have 
called for a closer examination of how and in what context  firms deploy their strategies of influence 
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(Bonardi and Keim 2005, Culpepper 2010, Perrow 2005). In this paper, we take a historical approach to 
examine firms’ responses to a new law to capture the dynamic interplay of legal constraints and firms’ 
ability to shape their legal environment.  
THE EMPIRICAL SETTING: THE INTRODUCTION OF THE SAFETY ACT OF 1966 
The issue of automobile safety harks back to 1902, when the trade magazine Horseless Age called 
for national government standards to regulate vehicle safety. In the 1920s Commerce Secretary Herbert 
Hoover fostered the elaboration of the “Three Es” approach to safety as a function of drivers’ Education, 
the Enforcement of a uniform vehicle code, and highway Engineering. Yet until the mid-1960s safety was 
not a salient issue in public discourse or for car companies, which, in their advertisements, competed on 
improved speed, horsepower, and styling. For example, Ford’s introduction of the first Safety Car in 1956 
was seen as a marketing failure and consolidated an industry-wide belief that “safety doesn’t sell” 
(Eastman 1984).  
In 1965, a then-unknown young lawyer, Ralph Nader, published Unsafe at Any Speed: The 
Designed-in Dangers of the American Automobile, an exposé of the automobile industry. In this book he 
introduced a new framing of safety as a function of car design, building on medical research in 
epidemiology (Haddon et al. 1964), which in the 1950s had shifted attention away from the cause of the 
accident (drivers’ inattention or badly maintained roads) to the cause of the injury (the contact between 
the passengers’ bodies and the vehicle’s components). This new conceptualization of safety implied that 
cars could be re-designed to limit the impact of accidents on their passengers. Nader focused on the 
design limitations of General Motors’ (GM) Chevrolet Corvair, depicted as “one of the greatest acts of 
industrial irresponsibility in the present century” (Nader 1965, p. 8) and blamed the industry for millions 
of deaths. Nader argued that the private regulation approach to safety had failed (evidenced, for instance, 
by GM spending less than one percent of its profits in 1964 to fund automobile accident research) and that 
only a new law could ensure every citizen’s “right to safety” (Viscusi et al. 1995) by forcing the auto 
industry to devote more resources to the manufacturing of safe cars.  
		 12 
The book’s initial sales were modest. While the public did not immediately take notice of Nader’s 
book, its chief target, GM, did. Worried about litigation that would challenge the Corvair’s safety, GM 
hired private detectives to follow Nader to unearth information that might discredit him. When journalist 
James Ridgeway published the story about GM’s investigations in The New Republic in 1966, Senator 
Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) summoned GM president, James Roche, to provide an explanation for his 
company’s harassment. After Roche’s apology, Nader’s book became an overnight bestseller, turning car 
safety into an issue of national concern (Luger 2000).  
METHODS 
Setting and Case Selection 
To explore how firms can influence their legal environment and what accounts for the State’s 
receptivity to corporate influence, we undertook a historical analysis of automakers’ responses to the 
Safety Act of 1966. Our analysis starts in 1965, when the automobile safety controversy began, and 
concludes in 1980, when significant changes in safety regulations had occurred. Historical methods are 
particularly appropriate when the research question aims to shed light on actions embedded in a context 
(Ingram et al. 2010, Ingram and Rao 2004). Temporal distance from the events of interest enables 
researchers to more easily move “between the particulars of the moment and the larger structural, cultural, 
and technological milieu that unfolds over longer time periods” (Hargadon 2015, p. 125), allowing for 
“greater breadth” and a “historically informed understanding” (Rao 1998, p. 921) of organizational 
actions that unfolded over an extended period of time (Tilly 1995). Additionally, the historical relevance 
of these events provides us with extensive documentation of the various actors’ perspectives and actions 
from multiple data sources, which allowed for data triangulation (Tilly and Goodin 2006). In sum, this 
case met the criteria for a revelatory case in which the processes of theoretical interest were “transparently 
observable” and could be thoroughly reconstructed (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Data Sources 
We collected data from a variety of sources, including congressional hearings, annual reports, 
advertisements, and newspaper and magazine articles. Table 1 contains an overview of the data sources. 
		 13 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Our data collection started with congressional hearings from 1965–1980 in the LexisNexis 
Congressional database, totaling almost 14,000 pages of transcripts. Hearings include testimonies, 
dialogue, and data tables. Actors’ testimonies in hearings are often scripted, yet they represent an 
opportunity for representatives of different groups—e.g., firms, consumer activists, and experts—to have 
their point of view heard. In this instance, all the major U.S. automakers were equally represented in the 
hearings. Although congressional hearings do not capture other influence tactics, such as lobbying, these 
data provide a reasonable proxy for the focal actors’ response to the new law. Additional data was derived 
from the annual reports of the four major U.S. automakers (GM, Ford, Chrysler, and AMC) from 1965–
1980, retrieved from the database ProQuest Historical Annual Reports, to capture firms’ official 
interpretations of regulatory changes for their shareholders (Greenwood et al. 2002).  
Furthermore, to capture the auto industry’s communication with its customers, we scanned and 
collected 367 car advertisements from 1965–1980. We searched in the library for print ads in publications 
from the time period and decided to focus on car magazines, such as Road and Track, Car and Driver, 
and Motor Trend, to increase the chances of finding auto-related ads. Other primary data sources included 
audio recordings of Oval Office meetings between Nixon and auto executives in 1971, which were 
obtained from the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, as well as the regulatory agency’s analyses, 
which were retrieved from its online archive. Additionally, we collected and analyzed all the 
“interpretation letters” (n=502) submitted between 1965 and 1980 to the regulatory agency by various 
stakeholders (automakers, suppliers, unions, senators, and highway patrol agencies), as well as associated 
replies by its Chief Counsel. Finally, we included newspaper and magazine articles (n=950) over the 
analysis period, as well as books and governmental reports from LexisNexis Congressional Database. We 
also reviewed auto safety articles published in professional and academic journals.  
Data Analysis 
 To analyze our data we relied on a “concurrent triangulation strategy” (Creswell 2003) that 
featured a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative analyses (an historical case study coupled with 
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computational quantitative text analysis) to develop grounded theorizing (Bail 2014). This approach 
results in “well-validated and substantiated findings” (Creswell, 2003, p. 213) by analyzing the same data 
using different methodological techniques, a process that allows researchers to cross-validate findings 
(Greene et al. 1989, Morgan 1998, Steckler et al. 1992) and “offset[s] the weaknesses inherent within one 
method with the strengths of the other” (Creswell, 2003, p. 213).  
Qualitative content analysis. We applied a historical case study analysis (Ingram et al. 2010, 
Ingram and Rao 2004) to develop theory regarding how and when firms can be effective in influencing 
their legal environment. To generate theoretical insights, we followed a three-step approach. First, 
following the precepts of grounded theory building with historical cases, we developed a basic narrative 
of facts pertaining to changes in legislation/regulation and automakers’ responses to such changes 
(Hargadon 2015, Hargadon and Douglas 2001, Leblebici et al. 1991). Through constant comparison – the 
iterative process of collecting and analyzing data – we became intrigued by how the same strategy that 
firms deployed to mitigate the impact of the new law (the inclusion of cost considerations in the 
assessment of safety) initially failed but later succeeded in the mid-1970s, resulting in a transformed legal 
environment. Our historical approach allowed us “not to search for the single set of causal forces 
responsible, but rather to see the variety of forces acting for and against the outcomes that ultimately 
prevailed” (Hargadon 2015, p. 125). Second, to elaborate on what accounted for firms’ eventual success 
in shaping their legal environment, we proceeded to build a more detailed chronology of events – critical 
incidents (e.g., Garud and Rappa 1994, Gehman et al. 2013) that affected the safety debate in the field 
(e.g., gasoline prices and transportation costs, or the political composition of Congress). This 
chronological structure allowed us to “break down big events into causally connected sequences of 
events, and examine each link in the chain” (Tilly 1995). For an overview of these events see Table 2. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, building on our chronology, we identified “precipitating events” (Gehman et al. 2013, p. 
89) – highly significant incidents that provided an impetus or opportunity for change within the field 
(Ansari et al. 2013) – such as the passing of the Safety Act in 1966, or the energy crisis of 1973. A focus 
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on these precipitating events led us to inductively identify three main phases in our narrative. For each 
phase, we mapped the key actors (e.g., automakers) that played a role in defining safety. In conducting 
this analysis, we were careful to obtain accurate data, favoring contemporaneous sources when possible, 
and to validate the data using multiple sources (Farjoun 2002). 
Alternating between our chronological account, the precipitating events, the actors involved, and 
firms’ actions, we constructed “interim narratives” (Gehman et al. 2013) to examine how these actions 
were linked. For example, we produced a narrative on firms’ legal actions after the Safety Act was 
introduced. We then considered how these legal battles related to our account of auto executives’ 
participation in congressional hearings, in which firms’ representatives publicly argued for a delay in 
regulatory requirements. We also developed a narrative on consumerism to consider the evolving cultural 
context in which firms’ actions were embedded. These interim narratives highlighted the multi-level 
nature of firms’ strategies, ranging from very practical inquiries regarding how to apply safety standards 
(e.g., in interpretation letters) to broader ideological claims regarding U.S. competitiveness to Congress; 
the analysis also revealed a non-linear and cumulative process of exerting influence over the legal arena. 
We recognized a pattern in carmakers’ actions through these narratives, which guided the aggregation of 
these interim accounts into historical “phases,” which amounted to an overall narrative (Pentland 1999) of 
firms’ responses to their legal environment over time. 
Quantitative content analysis. To triangulate the results of our historical case study, we employed 
computational text-mining methods to identify “deeper patterns or structures of meaning” (Mohr et al. 
2013, p. 676), thus complementing traditional “qualitative” text analysis (Mohr et al. 2013). Given that 
computer-aided content analysis includes a wide array of methodologies, our specific research design 
considerations were: (1) to provide synthesis and analytical insightfulness, and (2) to account for multi-
level effect, since our analysis spans across societal, field, and industry levels of analysis (thus 
overcoming a common limitation of organizational analysis; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Our design 
considerations led us to choose three computer-aided techniques: semantic network analysis, topic 
modeling, and Google N-grams. 
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Semantic network analysis: tracking the industry’s understanding of safety. Our theoretical and 
empirical interest centers on the organizational responses to the introduction of a new law. For this 
reason, we chose to use semantic network text analysis (Popping 2000) to illustrate in detail how the 
automakers’ conceptualization of safety changed between 1965 and 1980. This method is the cornerstone 
of our quantitative approach, as it reflects the core interest of this paper (organizational responses). 
To capture how the industry “talked” about safety, we used automakers’ annual reports, in which 
firms made sense of challenges and opportunities for their shareholders. Structural network methods have 
proven to be powerful analytical tools in revealing the content and evolution in actors’ logics, categories, 
and, more generally, cultural systems (Jones et al. 2012). To generate semantic networks, we relied on the 
AutoMap software package. Network text analysis hinges on the principle of creating networks of words, 
in which meanings can be inferred from the co-usage among concepts (Carley 1994, Jones et al. 2012). 
Within such networks, nodes are concepts and ties represent how frequently two linked concepts co-occur 
within a specific text window (Appendix A details our procedure step-by-step). We used this technique to 
reveal how automakers (a) employed different safety-related concepts and (b) changed these semantic 
associations over time. Given our focus, we analyzed the ego-networks of “safety” (i.e., the associations 
of “safety” with other concepts) and focused on only the strongest (most frequent) associations among 
concepts. To further simplify interpretation of the maps, we circled clusters of words related to theoretical 
concepts using a clustering analysis performed with UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002).  
Topic modeling: field-level changes in cultural context. While our paper is centered on the 
responses of the regulated organizations, we still want to account for change at other levels in which 
automakers were embedded. Given the availability of a large volume of unstructured texts (84 annual 
reports, 25 congressional hearings, 950 newspaper articles – approximately 20,000 pages in total), a 
network-based approach to study symbolic change at levels above the organization would not have been 
feasible. We employed topic modeling to analyze and label the emergence and diffusion of topics across 
time and key actors (the automotive companies, the State, and the media) because this method is 
particularly suited to highlight patterns of meaning in a large corpus of texts and show changes in culture 
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across time (Mohr et al. 2013, p. 675; Bonilla and Grimmer 2013, Miller 2013, Mohr and Bogdanov 
2013). Topic modeling is also a great complement to network text analysis because it treats texts as “bags 
of words” (Giorgi and Weber 2015) that loosely co-occur within documents, and are identified in a 
probabilistic fashion (unlike network text analysis’ more deterministic approach to meaning that 
highlights co-occurrences within a text). The juxtaposition of the two allows us to offer a more 
encompassing view of the evolution of meanings at the field level, while at the same time detailing the 
specifics of the automakers’ point of view. Table 3 provides a list of the topics extracted by our model; 
Appendix A provides a detailed explanation of the analytical procedure used to extract them. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Google’s N-grams: societal-level changes in cultural context. Finally, we employed Google’s N-
gram Viewer to follow macro cultural changes that related to issues of auto safety to offer a synthetic, 
birds-eye view of societal changes. Google’s N-gram Viewer uses a subset of the entire Google Books 
corpus (500 billion words from 5 million books) to extract changes in the frequencies of a set of words 
(also known as an n-gram) through time. In particular, we focused on the 3-gram term “Cost Benefit 
Analysis” because of its centrality in our qualitative analysis. The N-gram Viewer traces how this term 
was used in published sources for any year and how such usage changed across different periods. Such an 
approach lies at the core of “culturomics,” the science of exploring temporal changes in cultural trends by 
analyzing large corpora of digitalized texts (Michel et al. 2011).  
FINDINGS 
In analyzing the influence of the law on firms and firms’ responses to change in their legal 
environment, we distinguished three main phases in the narrative: phase 1 (1965-1966) witnessed the 
emergence of activism in support of a new definition of safety and the passing of new legislation; phase 2 
(1967-1972) was characterized by intense regulatory activity and firms’ compliance with the new legal 
mandates; and phase 3 (1973-1979) saw a re-emergence of firms’ strategies to influence their legal 
environment, centered around the inclusion of cost considerations in the evaluation of safety.  
Phase 1 – Firms’ failure to influence their legal environment (1965-66) 
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Before Nader’s safety controversy, the auto industry’s engagement with the State had consisted of 
discreet, private negotiations with Washington (Vogel 1989). According to commentators at the time, 
automobile executives were caught off guard by the “mounting political pressures for government 
intervention advanced in the name of public interest” because such executives were “the products of a 
system that discouraged attention to matters outside the technical purviews of their job” (Cordz 1966, p. 
117). Although firms’ top managers initially dismissed the rising consumer movement as a fad (Nader 
1965), they decided to present a unified front in the 1965 and 1966 Congressional hearings. To oppose the 
introduction of new legislation, automakers claimed that safety considerations had to be balanced in light 
of their costs and make sense “from a commercial standpoint in a competitive marketplace” (Claybrook 
and Bollier 1985, p. 94). Since the primary “responsibility of auto manufacturers was to stay in business 
by responding to the desires and demands of the motoring public” (Federal Role in Traffic Safety 1965, p. 
659), the industry argued that government mandated safety devices would impose an economic burden on 
consumers, stripping them of their freedom of choice (Federal Role in Traffic Safety 1965, p. 673).  
 Despite the industry’s opposition, in 1966 Congress unanimously passed the Safety Act, which 
authorized the federal government to set and regulate standards for motor vehicles (Mashaw and Harfst 
1990). Congress openly rejected the industry’s cost-conscious arguments because, as Senator Ribicoff put 
it, the goal of the new law was to ensure every citizen’s right to safety independent of individual 
preferences:  
In other words, the argument is that safety doesn’t sell; that the public is not ready for it; that the 
public is indifferent; that the public does not want it – it does not really hold. […] The question is 
not does he want them. This to me is a shocking thing, the attitude that was developed yesterday 
and here by you [i.e., industry executives]. In other words, what is your responsibility to produce a 
safe car? (Federal Role in Traffic Safety 1965, p.675) 
 
To translate the Safety Act into actionable guidelines that would drive technological advancements, 
a new governmental agency – the National Highway Traffic Safety Bureau, renamed the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Agency (NHTSA) in 1970 as part of the Department of Transportation – was 
established with a twofold mission: order recalls of defective cars and set safety standards for all motor 
vehicles. A recall is a request for the return of a product that is suspected of being faulty or dangerous; 
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before 1966, the automakers had conducted ad hoc recalls when motorists happened to bring their cars in 
to the dealers. After 1966, NHTSA was in charge of investigating, ordering, and widely publicizing 
recalls. Safety standards – engineering standards that a vehicle must meet in order to be certified for sale 
– represented the real novelty in the agency’s mandate. At the time, lawmakers envisioned an engineering 
utopia in which cars would be safe irrespective of their drivers (Mashaw and Harfst 1990) and believed 
that NHTSA’s standard setting would “channel the creative energies and vast technology of the 
automobile industry into a vigorous and competitive effort to improve the safety of vehicles” (The Senate 
Commerce Committee Report for the Traffic Safety Act of 1966). Under the new law, safety was the 
overriding consideration in the issuance of new standards (Federal Role in Traffic Safety 1965), marking 
a significant failure of firms’ efforts to include cost considerations in rule-making.  
Phase 2 - Firms’ compliance with the new law (1967–1972) 
The introduction of a new law and of a new regulatory agency had a dramatic effect on the auto 
industry’s practices and outcomes. Automakers engaged in substantive compliance because, as Henry 
Ford II put it, “if we can’t meet them [the new safety standards] when they are published, we’ll have to 
close down” (Claybrook and Bollier 1985, p. 97). In 1967, NHTSA mandated 30 new safety standards 
geared at increasing vehicles’ crashworthiness by introducing, for instance, laminated windshields to 
absorb head impact shocks and enhanced door locks to keep occupants from being ejected from cars. 
Although the added safety features were largely invisible to car buyers, they amounted to an additional 
$170 per car in 1968. These compliance costs kept increasing, reaching $291 in 1973, and severely 
affecting U.S. automakers’ cost structures and profitability, as indicated by Figure 1.  
 [FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Car advertisements also reflected this period’s emphasis on safety. From 1966 to 1972, almost forty 
percent of ads prominently featured safety (compared with a mere 11% in the 1955–1965 period). 
Competition also triggered this emphasis; for instance, in the early 1970s, Volvo ran an advertising 
campaign entitled “It shouldn’t take an act of Congress to make cars safe” to stress its long-standing 
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commitment to safety. Even in their letters to shareholders, the automakers noticed how the legal 
environment had radically changed:  
In the past, our success has depended primarily on our response to the test of the marketplace. In 
the future, we shall be severely tested by the need to respond at the same time to the requirements 
of the market and the requirements imposed by the Federal government’s safety and air pollution 
regulations. The enactment of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 was an 
event of far reaching implications for your company and the entire motor vehicle industry (Ford 
Motor Co. 1967: 3) 
 
Despite feeling “buffeted, beleaguered, and threatened by the changes” (Gioia 1992, p. 380), the 
automakers engaged in substantive compliance with the new legal demands. 
Deflecting blame. Automakers also adopted the new law’s definition of safety as car design, while 
attempting to deflect the blame for car accidents. They did so by claiming the new legally sanctioned 
definition of safety as part of their tradition and by treating the two previously conflicting approaches to 
safety (the Three Es vs. car design) as complementary. A semantic network analysis based on firms’ 
annual reports highlights this change in the regulated firms’ repertoire. Figure 2a displays the semantic 
network of U.S. automakers between 1965 and 1966, while Figure 2b captures semantic associations with 
safety from 1967 to 1972.  
 [FIGURES 2a-2b ABOUT HERE] 
A comparison of the two semantic networks reveals striking differences. Before the new law, 
automakers employed the word safety as a generic qualifier to describe marketed cars, alongside terms 
such as equipment, feature, and quality. After 1967 the semantic network of safety became more 
sophisticated, suggesting a greater centrality of this concept in automakers’ discourse. The semantic 
network presented in Figure 2b features the new definition of safety and its alignment with the 
automakers’ tradition, as evidenced by the frequent associated of the word “continue” with safety. In 
addition to emphasizing their continuing efforts in the sphere of safety, automakers deflected the blame 
that Nader had cast on the industry as the reckless culprit for millions of deaths by bringing attention to 
the concept of traffic safety, which combined Nader’s definition of safety as car design with the 
traditional Three Es’ approach, as the example below suggests:   
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The company, from its beginning, has been vitally concerned with the entire field of traffic safety, 
not only in the design and building of safer vehicles but also in programs promoting better 
highway design, driver improvement, vehicle inspection and other programs aimed at a total 
approach to safety. The company will, both through its own engineering and research and 
through cooperative efforts with the National Traffic Safety Agency, work for reasonable and 
practical solutions to problems of traffic safety. (American Motors Corp. 1968; emphasis added) 
 
This example, among others, highlights automakers’ attempts to turn vehicle safety into a mere 
subset of traffic safety. Consistent with these findings, the semantic network used at the time – 
represented in Figure 2b - reveals a stronger link between safety, drivers/occupants, and 
education/information, subtly suggesting that drivers’ lack of driving skills and education were 
problematic for safety.  
In sum, by 1972, the State’s power of coercion over automakers seemed to be strong and well-
established, as evidenced by NHTSA’s ability to increase mandatory equipment in cars, and the passing 
of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act in 1972, which was seen as “another significant 
victory for the American consumer” (Nixon 1972). 
Phase 3 – Firms’ influence in re-defining safety (1973-1980) 
Yet starting in 1973, NHTSA's ability to enforce new standards faltered. Figure 1, which 
documents the stalling (1973-75) and then declining (1976-1980) costs of safety equipment, provides 
evidence of legal mandates’ waning impact on automobile firms. Whereas such costs increased by 
approximately 58% in the first five years of NHTSA’s operations, they only increased by 1% over the 
following five years. By the 1980s, most of NHTSA’s standards (43 out of 50, or 86%) had been 
promulgated between 1966 and 1972, suggesting a significant shift in the agency’s rulemaking power 
after those initial years.   
Our empirical analysis shows that, between 1973 and 1980, carmakers were successful in 
influencing their regulatory environment by fostering the introduction of a new analytic tool 
(Jarzabkowski and Kaplan 2015, p. 537; Kaplan and Jarzabkowski 2006, p. 202) to evaluate safety 
standards: Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). By resonating with the cultural context at the time, CBA 
succeeded in transforming the law’s original “safety per se” approach and NHTSA’s regulatory focus. 
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Below we detail firms’ specific tactics to spur the adoption of CBA and describe the outcome of this 
analytic tool. Finally, we discuss the role of the broader cultural context in favoring firms’ influence on 
the application of the new law.  
 A new analytic tool: Cost-benefit analysis. Originally devised by the Army Corps of Engineers 
to justify investments in particular projects (Porter 1996), CBA became central to automakers’ corporate 
communications to shareholders (as visualized in Figure 2c) as a neutral tool that would provide a clearly 
defined procedure to justify and evaluate NHTSA’s safety standards and de-politicize standard setting. 
Many critics of CBA at the time pointed out that, by transforming qualitative values, such as people’s 
health and quality of life, into quantitative distinctions  that could then be compared with automakers’ 
costs (Bermiss et al. 2014, p. 591), this analytic tool greatly discounted the value of health and human life 
(Bobbit and Calabresi 1978). In the words of Joan Claybrook, NHTSA’s administrator between 1977 and 
1981, CBA was “no substitute for the complex moral and scientific considerations that must inform 
regulatory judgment. Despite their apparent objectivity, numbers and dollars are like shadows: they give a 
fuzzy approximation of regulatory benefits but they do not capture the essence of the benefits, which are 
distinctly qualitative” (Claybrook and Bollier 1985, p. 125). In the following paragraphs, we identify two 
sets of tactics through which automakers fostered the introduction of CBA as part of NHTSA’s rule-
making process: tactics targeted directly at the regulatory agency or indirectly through Congress and the 
courts.  
Direct targeting of the regulatory agency. To directly stall NHTSA’s work, automakers 
inundated NHTSA with clarification letters, requests for meetings, and phone calls. Our analysis of the 
clarification letters received by NHTSA3 shows that automakers’ requests for technical clarifications 
increased by 500% between 1973 and 1980 compared with the previous six years and often included a 
                                                
3 To explore automakers’ tactics to stall rule-making and overturn the balance of power, we analyzed automakers’ 
469 clarification letters sent to NHTSA between 1967 and 1980. We analyzed the letters in two manners. First, we 
read all of them in order to get a contextual understanding of their content and their usage. Second, we coded them 
to trace the evolution of main themes using two trained coders. From this analysis, we noted an increase in the 
number of clarification requests and in the use of cost-benefit analysis as a way to question the legitimacy of 
NHTSA’s rulemaking (e.g., Hiatt and Park 2013). 
		 23 
cost rationale for a particular standard’s implementation. For instance, in November 1979, AMC sent a 
clarification letter to NHTSA asking whether it would be admissible to remove the lap-belt buckle switch 
from its safety belts. In the letter, AMC reminded NHTSA that removing the switch would reduce costs 
by an estimated $1.50 per vehicle, resulting in “industry-wide potential savings of $15 million per year.” 
This specific proposal was rejected, but it led to cost-based amendments to other standards. Similarly, in a 
January 1976 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler noted that a potential rulemaking delay could cost the company 
in excess of $600,000 in wasteful research and development. Thus, NHTSA administrator Richard Dyson 
provided Chrysler with a written assurance that the previous standard would be delayed to avoid 
unnecessary costs. In sum, automakers’ constant petitions for amendment, interpretation, or waiver of 
existing rules diverted the agency’s resources away from the rulemaking process and brought attention to 
the cost-implications and lack of precision of new standards.   
Indirect targeting of the regulatory agency: Congress and the courts. In Congress, automakers 
expressed a concern about a “total safety” approach – the regulation of safety without cost considerations 
– which had negative repercussions on the U.S. economy (e.g., Air Bag Conversation 1971). Although 
carmakers continued to embrace the law’s definition of safety as car design and expressed their adherence 
to government mandates, they also labeled safety standards as a “risk to the U.S. economy” (Ford Motor 
Co. 1979) because regulation diverted economic resources away from more pressing societal issues, such 
as unemployment, inflation, and the loss of U.S. competitiveness in favor of Japanese automakers. As 
shown in firms’ semantic network (Figure 2c), the words “economy,” “public,” and “industry” became 
more central to automakers’ safety-related discourse, highlighting the issue’s embeddedness in the macro-
environment, as well as the direct link between higher costs, public interest, and regulations.  
[FIGURE 2c ABOUT HERE] 
In the 1973 congressional hearing on the mandatory inclusion of seatbelts and airbags, Ford 
openly argued for calculating “the costs of restraint systems relative to the resulting benefits.” A few 
years later, GM’s chief economist, Henry Duncombe, calculated that regulatory costs amounted to $6 
billion a year, with “only little knowledge of whether the benefits, to individuals or to society as a whole, 
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would exceed the costs” (The Automobile Industry and its Impact upon the Nation’s Economy 1975, p. 
43). GM and other automakers requested a pause in safety requirements to “give the Government and the 
industry time to evaluate fully the cost effectiveness of regulations—existing and proposed—and to find 
better ways of meeting Government requirements” (The Automobile Industry and its Impact upon the 
Nation’s Economy 1975, p. 49). In addition to industry representatives and Republican congressmen, 
union leaders were also sympathetic to the industry’s concerns, as the quote below from the president of 
the United Automobile Workers exemplifies:  
The automobile industry is at its most critical impasse since before World War II. The automobile 
industry has asked for a 5-year pause in additional emission requirements, and we are essentially 
supporting them in that […] To put this in national context, the unemployed in the four auto 
companies constitute over three-tenths of one percent of the entire U.S. labor force. […] The 
fundamental need in our economy is to assure full employment, and that won’t happen all by itself. 
(The Automobile Industry and its Impact upon the Nation’s Economy 1975) 
 
Automakers further challenged the procedural elements of NHTSA’s standard setting in a series of 
legal cases. For example, the H&H Tire Co v. DOT decision put a substantial burden on NHTSA to 
demonstrate that new regulations were cost-effective. This case referred to Standard 117, a rule regarding 
the performance requirements for retreaded tires. The Seventh Circuit struck down the agency’s 
rulemaking because Standard 117 had not been shown to be “economically feasible” (Mashaw and Harfst 
1990, p. 94). Similarly, the Chrysler v. DOT decision regarding Standard 208 (airbag installations) placed 
an enormous burden on the agency to develop test specifications if new technologies were to be required 
in regulation. Since the agency needed on-the-road evidence of safety effects before it could regulate, it 
was nearly impossible to require the adoption of any new technology. NHTSA was thus caught in a catch-
22; the courts did not support ambiguous rules – rules that did not offer precise estimates of costs and 
technical requirements for automakers – yet NHTSA could not be specific without adequate data on the 
technology that it wanted to regulate. These data were not available, as automakers would not introduce 
new equipment without a rule requiring the addition of new safety features.  
These two cases, among others, pushed the perception that NHTSA’s regulations were costly and 
unnecessary. Frequent litigation forced NHTSA to devote resources to these challenges, slowing down its 
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rulemaking process significantly; by the mid-1970s, new standards had a gestation period three times as 
long as the initial standards (Mashaw and Harfst 1990, p. 78). As an NHTSA’s administrator put it, cost-
benefit analysis had become a “political subterfuge” (Claybrook and Bollier 1985, p. 130). 
Outcome: Firms’ success in influencing regulation. The automakers’ push for the introduction 
of CBA contributed to a significant change in the regulation of safety laws. By the end of 1970s, the 
language of cost-benefit analysis had become standard practice for evaluating NHTSA’s proposed and 
final regulations, shifting from a total safety approach to a de-radicalized, cost-conscious conception of 
auto safety. Our topic modeling analysis—performed on automakers’ annual reports, congressional 
hearings, and newspaper articles—revealed that U.S. automakers championed cost-benefit considerations, 
which became pervasive across the different stakeholders in the auto industry. In all three instances, the 
topics centered on the “safety-as-design” concept became less prevalent during the 1973–1980 period 
compared with the 1966–1972 (Figure 3a); moreover, topics that highlighted the importance of cost-
benefit considerations, economic restrictions due to NHTSA’s regulations, and increasing imports and gas 
prices became much more frequent (Figure 3b). This switch was perhaps most dramatic when the analysis 
was solely focused on congressional hearings: 1973 marked an abrupt change in the discourse and 
relevance of the two approaches to safety— from an overriding to a relative consideration (Figure 3c). 
[FIGURE 3a, 3b and 3c ABOUT HERE] 
Automakers’ direct and indirect tactics against NHTSA not only resulted in a series of amendments 
(e.g., 18 amendments of Standard 121) and regulatory notices, but also put NHTSA under severe scrutiny 
and criticism in Congress, fundamentally undermining its credibility as a regulatory agency. The 
following quotation by an executive at a truck manufacturing company exemplifies this change:  
We think that it is timely for Congress to review the performance of the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration in connection with their regulatory record on the 121 brake standards. We 
believe that a review of the record in this matter will disclose that NHTSA has, first, not followed 
the statutory mandate laid down by the Congress and, second, that it has created procedural 
confusion and, third, that it has deceived Members of Congress and the public, and fourth, that it 
has failed to disclose the important data and, fifth, that it has never adequately defined safety, or 
clearly marked out its objectives. Finally, and most importantly it has endangered the users of our 
public highways. […] Perhaps the most fundamental problem with NHTSA is its failure to define 
safety problems and then act to correct those problems without creating counterproductive side 
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effects. (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act Amendments 1976, p. 4) 
 
Originally established to set appropriate vehicle safety standards, by 1980 NHTSA had become a 
rather ineffectual agency that was limited to enforcing recalls, without the clear ability to set a forward-
looking technological agenda to improve vehicle safety (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). An investigation of 
federal regulation by Congressman John E. Moss’s (D-California) Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigation found that the increased pressure on NHTSA to produce cost-benefit justifications for safety 
rules led to the abandonment or postponement of several safety rules. For example, in 1976, NHTSA’s 
Associate Administrator, Robert Carter, reported that he had ordered the abandonment of a 1971 proposal 
to require the installation of rear under-ride guards on trucks, after an economic analysis predicted that the 
costs would exceed the benefits (Regulatory Reform 1976).  
 In sum, CBA had a transformative effect on firms’ regulative environment, and became so deeply 
entrenched that even a safety violation scandal such as the Ford’s Pinto case did not undermine its 
application. In response to the challenge from more compact European and Japanese cars, in 1970 Ford 
introduced the Pinto, a small car whose fuel tank could rupture when struck from the rear at a relatively 
low speed. Modifications to the tank to avoid the fire cost only $11 per car to install, but Ford used CBA 
to justify the decision not to introduce the modifications. Despite images of Pinto’s fires proliferating in 
the media (Gioia 1992, p. 381) and a public uproar led to the discontinuation of this particular model, the 
CBA principle that led to the incidents was no longer under scrutiny. In the following paragraphs, we use 
our data to argue that the automakers’ effectiveness in the third phase hinged on a significant change in 
the broader cultural context.  
An important contingency: The cultural context (1965-1980) 
 The empirical evidence emerging from our analysis suggests that firms’ effectiveness in 
influencing their legal environment hinged on the degree to which their strategies were culturally 
consonant with a changing cultural context. Because cultural context can be quite a broad concept 
(Benford and Snow 2000, Giorgi and Weber 2015, Ingram and Silverman 2016), we focused on the 
beliefs, myths, and values that were most relevant to the auto safety debate, which in this case was the rise 
		 27 
of Consumerism in the 1960s and the anti-Consumerism movement of the 1970s. Consumerism hinged on 
a distrust of big business, the belief in individual consumers’ rights to safe and durable products, and in 
mobilization for new consumer protection legislation (Herrmann 1970). Often sparked by journalistic 
exposes of the dangers of widely used products or natural resources (such as Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring, published in 1962), consumerism campaigns identified over-powerful and immoral corporations 
as the enemy (Gabriel and Lang 2015: 180-3), aimed at introducing regulation to increase standards of 
business conduct, and were backed by shifting coalitions of activists, labor organizations, consumer 
cooperatives, credit unions, and consumer education organizations. At the political level, the success of 
the Civil Rights movement, President John F. Kennedy’s Consumers’ Bill of Rights (1962), and President 
Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” speech in 1965 contributed to beliefs about progress and rising quality 
of life. At the technological level, the space race fostered the myth that firms possessed the capabilities to 
design and manufacture completely safe products (Mashaw and Harfst 1990).  
 Yet by the 1970s, the anti-business attitudes of consumerism started being interpreted as un-
American (Rao 1998). In the media, consumerism became tainted as an adversarial culture that could not 
jolt the nation’s economy. Rising oil prices, inflation rates, the loss of U.S. competitiveness in the global 
marketplace, and unemployment rates led Congress to hold hearings on the economy’s ability to sustain 
growth and increase employment (United States 1976). In these hearings, the auto industry’s role in 
stimulating the nation’s growth was broadly acknowledged. The auto industry, previously blamed for 
millions of deaths, was instead portrayed as a victim of costly regulation, as the quote below exemplifies: 
A consensus appears to be developing that regulatory costs have indeed suffocated Chrysler and 
damaged the auto industry’s competitive structure. This growing consensus is supported by recent 
findings of four consulting groups, two of which prepared reports for the Federal Government and 
one for Chrysler. Even the General Accounting Office has gotten into the act. Federal law requires 
that all automobiles built after Sept. 1, 1983 be equipped with passive seat belt restraints or air 
bags, yet the G.A.O. has questioned the airbags’ effectiveness and said they would cost as much as 
$580 a car, rather than the $112 quoted by the highway safety administration. It’s pretty clear by 
now that it’s easier to write a law than it is to build an automobile (The New York Times 1979). 
 
This criticism was at times directly targeted at NHTSA. For example, Standard 101, which required 
“controls in passenger cars to be located within the comfortable reach of a fifth percentile adult female 
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restrained by lap and upper torso restraint seat belt” (Mashaw and Harfst 1990, p. 75-76), became the 
object of ridicule in newspapers for its pedantic language. Although the number of consumer complaints 
concerning safety defects and demand for recalls had steadily increased throughout the 1970s (Mashaw 
and Harfst 1990), NHTSA’s rules were often derided in the media as unnecessary and excessive. This 
discursive shift is reflected in a Google N-gram analysis on sources published between 1966 and 1980, as 
reported in Figure 4. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
The Google N-gram’s comparison of “auto safety” and “cost benefit analysis” reveals a dramatic 
change in the prominence of these two topics around 1973, as the latter started to appear more frequently 
than the former in published texts. Moreover, while auto safety continued being an important topic of 
discussion, its discussion started to be much more frequently paired with cost-benefit considerations. 
These changes represented a substantial shift in the cultural context surrounding the automakers, which 
aligned automakers’ cost-driven claims on safety with the prevailing discourse, beliefs, and 
understanding. Below we discuss how the cultural context differs from the economic and the political 
contexts. We then examine potential alternative explanations for our findings. 
Cultural vs. economic context. The energy crisis of 1973 contributed to widespread perceptions of 
a deteriorating economy, which, at the time, consolidated opposition to the tenets of consumerism. A 
change in cultural context, however, should not be seen as the inevitable outcome of changed economic 
conditions, for at least two reasons. First, mainstream newspaper and magazine articles had opposed the 
values and beliefs of consumerism before the energy crisis (e.g., The New York Times 1971). Second, 
research shows that economic challenges do not necessarily explain a rise in pro-business sentiments 
(Weiss 1967). For example, economic challenges have been invoked to explain the rise of consumerism 
in the 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s (Herrmann 1970, p. 55). In our case, we believe that widespread 
perceptions of economic stagnation helped solidify a shift in the cultural context away from the 
consumerism of the 1960s. In sum, economic stagnation cannot account per se for the shift to pro-
business beliefs and values.  
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Cultural vs. political context. It is important to note that the evolving cultural context did not 
neatly align with the political context of the 1970s. While Nixon (1969-1974) was a Republican with a 
decisively pro-business orientation, the composition of Congress throughout the 1970s still favored 
Democrats in both houses of Congress, and more than sixty consumer activists were given major 
positions in the Carter administration (Vogel 1989). For instance, in 1977, Joan Claybrook, who had 
worked with Nader to introduce the Safety Act of 1966, was appointed as the new NHTSA administrator. 
The agency quickly issued a new set of standards, which, for example, prevented tampering with 
odometers, extended steering column protections, and improved frontal crash protection, as all these 
factors had been proven as effective to save lives (Passive Restraint Rule 1977). However, Congress was 
no longer unanimous in accepting a “per se” safety argument, as the statement below suggests:  
Regulation is a necessary and proper responsibility for Government to protect the consumer. No 
one can dispute this, nor the basic overall need for the presence of Government. The only question 
is to what degree and at what cost. We will never achieve a risk-free society due to our resource 
and technical limitations. Society's job and the legislator's job as the public's representative is to 
define the minimum acceptable risks to health, safety, and the environment for the American 
people. (Cost of Government Regulation to the Consumer 1978, p. 2) 
 
Despite a political environment favorable to activists and liberal policies, the cultural 
context in the 1970s had shifted away from the ideals of consumerism, creating an opportunity for 
firms to find new cultural consonance between their efforts to shape the legal environment and the 
changed cultural context. 
Alternative Explanations 
While our use of extensive qualitative and quantitative data provides us with confidence in our 
findings, we also consider the possibility of two alternative explanations. First, we consider the notion 
that perhaps NHTSA reached beyond its original mandate and lawmakers felt the need to rein it in after 
an initial push in mandating safety equipment. To fully consider this alternative, it is important to clarify 
NHTSA’s original 1966 mandate. The agency was given wide power to promote the development of new 
safety and crash-avoidance technologies through rulemaking. The agency was not simply tasked to 
enforce technological best practices, but to actively promulgate laws to drive the development of new, 
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innovative safety technology. Under these premises, it is difficult to believe that NHTSA actually 
overreached its mandate, especially considering that the first waves of safety standards (before 1973) 
required either small, incremental improvements, or simply mandated technology that was already widely 
available in the market, usually sold as optional. Indeed, the first batch of standards (1966-1967) was 
toned down after widespread protest from the automotive industry, due to the lack of preparation time 
given to the producers to adapt to them. The second generation of standards (13 new rules) was not any 
more radical than the first batch; it mandated common, though optional features such as theft protection, 
head restraint, safety belts, and steering blocks. Despite being technologically modest innovations, 
estimates suggest that the newly mandated featured made cars on average 30% safer (Crandall et al. 
1986). Comparing the modest innovation results to NHTSA’s wide original mandate, it is hard to believe 
they overreached and their power needed to be curbed. 
 A second alternative explanation is that NHTSA’s demands for safety features pushed the 
industry to its technological limits, hence prompting an obvious switch in the agency’s focus to recalls. In 
this case, one might expect a much slower progression in safety development after 1973. However, a 
closer assessment of the technological trajectory of the industry suggests otherwise (Holt 2005). In 1971, 
NHTSA published a far-reaching technological plan (“Program Plan for Motor Safety Standards”) to 
describe its vision for standards to be promulgated in that decade. The plan included technological 
advancements such as airbags, radar brakes, periscopes, alcohol interlocks, and speed limiters, all of 
which promised to drastically reduce traffic fatalities by half by 1980. While some of these technologies 
required development, others were readily available. For example, the airbag, which experts consider 
(together with safety belts) as the most efficient safety device in the history of the automotive industry 
(Holt 2005), had been prototyped over a decade earlier in 1953, but only became a mandatory component 
for cars in 1998 (Kent 2003). An estimate by NHTSA in 1969 suggested that the airbag alone would have 
saved between ten to twelve thousands lives per year, more than all the previous forty-nine rules of the 
agency summed together (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Other devices, such as ignition interlocks (briefly 
marketed in 1974 by General Motors) and automatic belt systems (developed by Volkswagen in 1975) 
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were also readily available to improve cars’ safety. American automakers consistently lagged behind 
Volvo (and other European brands) in introducing the latest development in seat belt technology 
(Johnneseen 1984), again suggesting that it was not a technological barrier that prevented NHTSA from 
introducing new standards. Together, all these examples show that technology development and 
availability could not account for a relaxing in legal requirements starting in the mid-1970s. 
THEORIZING FIRMS’ INFLUENCE IN THEIR LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
We have provided evidence describing how the relationship between automakers and their legal 
environment can be seen as an undulating balance of power over time, suggesting that compliance and 
captive perspectives can both find support in the same relationship when studied over time. Specifically, 
we show that what had been initially strong environmental pressure for firm compliance later gave way to 
automakers’ finding greater influence over their legal environment, and that this differential success was 
due to shifts in firms’ cultural context over time. In this way, our cultural contingency perspective 
synthesizes and reconciles the two historically dominant and opposing views on the organization/legal 
environment relationship, i.e., the constraining power of the legal environment (compliance) vs. the 
privileged position of firms in shaping rule-making (capture).  
Fundamentally, our perspective takes seriously the cultural context of political struggles, 
suggesting that changes in cultural context present a blend of opportunities and constraints for 
contestation and effective influence. Our study shows that when regulatory demands are consonant with 
the dominant cultural context, firms’ level of compliance will be higher, ceteris paribus. However, 
changes in the broader cultural context (largely due to exogenous forces) may provide firms with 
opportunities to deploy strategies of influence that, if consonant, allow firms to shape the legal 
environment to their advantage. Our emphasis on cultural context as changing over time also suggests, in 
terms of analytical generalizability, that the process described above can repeat itself. Figure 5 
summarizes our theoretical view of this process.  
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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In Figure 5 we situate the three historical phases identified in our findings as elements 
contributing to an ongoing cycle of contestation and settlement/resettlement between firms and their legal 
environment. We label our three inductively derived phases as: theorization – a period characterized by 
efforts to justify or oppose the introduction of new legal constraints; compliance – a phase in which a 
settlement has been reached and firms abide to the translation of law into actionable standards; and 
transformation – a phase characterized by firms’ successful efforts to change the meaning and application 
of the law. While our study’s detailed historical coverage ends in 1980, our Figure 5 also indicates that 
after the transformation phase (1973-1980), a new settlement was reached in favor of firms with the de-
regulation of the 1980s. Our phases reflect a more circular – rather than linear – process to emphasize the 
likely ongoing relevance of cultural context, whereby changes in cultural context could again shape 
renewed contestation, renewed opportunities for cultural consonance, and thus changes in the balance of 
power between firms and their legal environment. Below we briefly discuss each phase and the role of 
cultural consonance in shaping the effectiveness of influence attempts.  
Theorization. In the first phase, the issue of safety was defined or framed (Mahon and Waddock 
1992) in conflicting ways by activists and automakers – respectively, as a function of car design or of the 
Three Es. While activists demanded the introduction of a new law to drastically reduce car accidents, 
firms opposed new legislation because of economic considerations (Gioia 1992). Contrary to the 
predictions of the capture perspective, firms’ extensive resources did not ensure success in the legal 
sphere. The outcome of this contestation phase between automakers and activists (and legislators) was the 
introduction of a new law and the creation of a new regulatory agency, with the mandate to set safety 
standards without explicit consideration of the costs tied to regulation. We find that a consumerist framing 
was culturally consonant with the cultural context of the 1960s: Lyndon Johnson’s ideals of the Great 
Society, the successes of the Civil Rights Movement, a burgeoning distrust in firms’ behavior (Gabriel 
and Lang 2015), and myths about the affordances of technology after landing a man on the moon 
(Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Automakers’ cost-based arguments lacked cultural consonance, and instead 
appeared greedy and out-of-touch.   
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 Compliance. Once the new law was passed, the emphasis shifted to NHTSA’s translation of the 
letter of the law into actionable standards. By offering a common framework to which actors needed to 
abide, the introduction of a new law sets the rules of the game (Huising and Silbey 2011, Kellogg 2009) 
and the automakers indeed succumbed to the coercive power of the law by introducing changes in vehicle 
design that significantly affected their cost structures and profitability. Although the automakers 
embraced a “total safety” approach that neutralized blame and negative perceptions (Anteby and Molnár 
2012), and some opposition to consumerism started to emerge during this phase (The New York Times 
1971), firms’ compliance with legal mandates fostered a period of “settlement” of the issue of safety – the 
restoring (albeit temporary) of a “generalized sense of order” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, p. 10) that 
occurs when an issue is no longer object of contention. 
Transformation. In the third phase, firms were able to transform the meaning and application of 
the law through the introduction of a new analytic tool, CBA, which shaped the regulatory agency’s rule-
making focus and power. Rather than rejecting the definition of safety as car design, CBA was presented 
as a tool that would rationalize the regulatory process and control the costs of regulation (Posner 2001) in 
the name of public interest. While the industry’s demands of a cost-conscious definition of safety had 
failed in the mid-1960s, they succeeded in the mid- to late 1970s because CBA was now more culturally 
consonant with the changed cultural context, which rejected the tenets of consumerism and instead 
emphasized fear of unemployment and beliefs that laxer regulation would restore economic prosperity.  
DISCUSSION 
By showing how cultural consonance exerted a strong and dynamic effect on the balance of 
power between firms and their legal environment, we offer a pathway for reconciling the two historically 
dominant and opposing perspectives of firms and the law (compliance versus capture). Our historical 
approach contextualizes (Ingram et al. 2012, Ingram and Silverman 2016) both the legal pressures for 
compliance and firms’ push against compliance, and it illuminates the role of cultural consonance in 
contributing to the differential effectiveness of firms’ strategies of influence. We analyzed how the 
change from one cultural moment to another, i.e., the dominance of the consumer movement in the 1960s 
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and the anti-consumerism wave of the 1970s, provided firms an opportunity to shape the impact of a new 
law through increased cultural consonance.  
This study adds to research on the role of powerful actors in their environments in organization 
theory (Barley 2007, 2010, Clegg et al. 2006, Perrow 2005, Zald and Lounsbury 2010), as well as 
research on the capture perspective (Burris 2001, Walker 2009, 2012, Walker and Rea 2014) by 
investigating alternative ways that firms can pursue political or nonmarket strategies to influence 
regulatory decision making (Davis 2005, Lee 2009, Shaffer et al. 2000). Prior research emphasized the 
importance of material resources (Dreiling 2000, Oliver 1991, Oliver and Holzinger 2008, Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) to alter the rulemaking process, for example, through legal action or connections to 
members of the political elite (Rao and Giorgi 2006). Throughout the time periods of our study (1965-
1980), the automobile industry commanded significant material resources (in 1966 the Big Three’s 
revenues amounted to 11% of the nation GDP, employing over 13 million workers), enjoyed political 
connections, and presented a unified front in fighting off the threats of its new legal environment. Yet all 
these factors were not sufficient predictors of firms’ success in securing favorable outcomes (Walker and 
Rea 2014). We contribute to this line of research by showing that when firms deploy strategies that are 
culturally consonant with widely accepted repertoires of beliefs and understandings, such strategies will 
enable firms to exert effective influence on their legal environment. Our analysis of the process by which 
firms gain influence over regulatory activity provides a richer understanding of firms’ political strategy 
and their impact on the law. By doing so, we respond to a call for more research that offers evidence of 
firms’ involvement in the political process and of political outcomes, i.e., “how business mobilizes and 
what it gets when it does” (Walker and Rea 2014, p. 284). 
With respect to the compliance perspective, we see our analysis as contributing to the neo-
institutionalist understanding of the law’s impact on organizations, which has been criticized for its 
tendency to treat the law simply as a coercive force that sets rules to which firms must conform (Hiatt et 
al. 2009, Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997, King et al. 2010, Marquis and Huang 2009). The first two phases 
of “theorization” and “compliance” reflect the dominant thinking in this perspective, according to which 
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federal law typically establishes broad guidelines for behavior; administrative agencies set practical rules 
and guidelines; and corporate actors respond by designing compliance strategies. This chain of events 
underlies the institutional pillar of coercive influence on organizations (Mizruchi and Fein 1999), which 
accounts for a settlement or truce within a field (Litrico and David 2016). Yet “transformation” in the 
legal sphere can occur when firms actively target formal State institutions, such as the courts and 
regulatory agencies, to introduce favorable change. Our study shows the role of firms’ strategies of 
influence – such as lawsuits, requests for clarifications, or smearing campaigns in Congress and in the 
media – in constraining an administrative agency’s ability for rulemaking. This finding is important to 
shed light on the firm/legal relationship because it shifts the attention from the compliance perspective’s 
almost exclusive focus on “policy making by legislators” to “policy implementation by regulatory 
agencies” (Hiatt and Park 2013, p. 932).  
We also bring attention to the implication of analytic tools (Kaplan and Jarzabkowski 2006), such 
as cost-benefit analysis, in guiding the translation of the law into practice. These seemingly neutral tools 
can have subversive effects on a regulatory agency’s ability to carry forth the original legal mandate 
because they embody a new technology of rationality (March 2006). In this case, while the original 
legislation intended to ensure safety per se, the adoption of CBA implied a more limited view of safety as 
a benefit that had to be balanced in light of its costs to manufacturers. Analytic tools can therefore be seen 
as an important way in which firms and industry groups engage in political struggle, manage uncertainty 
(e.g., Gargiulo 1993), and redefine their legal constraints. These arguments also have significant 
implications for the current analysis of legal implementation in institutional approaches. Research on 
legal endogeneity has noticed that compliance is partly influenced by the institutional field that the law 
intended to regulate. This is because firms conform not to the law itself – which is relatively ambiguous – 
but to the recipes of compliance developed by the professions (Dobbin 2009, Edelman 2007, Edelman et 
al. 1999, Edelman et al. 2011, Edelman and Stryker 2005, Talesh 2009). We contribute to this line of 
work by showing the strategic efforts of firms to channel the process of legal implementation to their 
advantage through a direct engagement with the courts, Congress, public opinion, and agencies. 
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While the capture perspective implicitly assumes that firms are skilled at crafting strategic actions 
to successfully shape their legal environment, it should be noted that our contingency perspective, with its 
emphasis on cultural consonance, is more agnostic on the issue of skill versus luck (Kahneman 2011). 
Cultural consonance occurs when there is harmony between firms’ actions and the cultural context in 
which the firms are embedded, and this harmony can be attained via careful deliberation or simply good 
fortune. Our analysis suggests that the changes in cultural context that occurred were largely exogenous to 
the firms’ actions, but that firms’ strategies in later periods were adapted to appease fears of 
unemployment and loss of competitiveness that achieved greater consonance with the changing cultural 
values and norms in the U.S. In other words, firms’ strategic actions resembled an emergent strategy 
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
Our analysis, however, also revealed unexpected and somewhat ironic implications. Specifically, 
while American automakers won the “battle for safety” in the 1970s, they lost the “war for profits” in the 
1980s, since Japanese (and European) manufacturers leveraged safety as a differentiation opportunity to 
develop and market cars that were not only smaller (and thus more fuel efficient), but fundamentally 
safer. It is particularly ironic that the triggers for Japanese technological advancements were NHTSA’s 
initial recalls (Toyota Motor Corporation 2012) and the agency’s Experimental Safety Vehicle (ESV), an 
international program aiming at creating the prototype of the safe car of the future. The Japanese 
government and manufactures ended up adopting many of the innovations generated by the ESV 
program, and in particular an S-shaped frame that allowed the car to better handle energy absorption, and 
had automatic lap belts, airbags, and disc brakes on all wheels. Many of these advancements were 
included in the redesigned Toyota Corona marketed in 1973, which ended up the best-selling compact car 
for the following 4 years and would become the boiler-plate for the successful Toyota expansion in the 
American market led by Toyota Corolla in the ensuing years. This outcome reveals that cultural 
consonance may sometimes serve as a double-edge sword: beneficial in the short term for firms seeking 
consonance, but potentially dangerous by providing competitors an opportunity to unseat incumbents in 
the future. 
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The core argument of our paper is the relationship between firms and their legal environment, 
which has been considered in terms of the core debate on “Who influences whom?” but can be better 
understood as a question whose answer is contingent on cultural context. Our arguments imply that the 
values incorporated in a new law – in our case, citizens’ right to safety, a risk-free society, or a belief in 
firms’ technological abilities – ultimately correspond to Selznick’s idea (1957) of “precarious values.” A 
value is precarious because it is always in danger of losing its flag carriers and representatives – that is, 
the active support by organized interest groups and elites that help preserve it against competing values 
(Favereau and Lazega 2002). Of course, this prompts a much larger question that goes beyond the scope 
of our study: How does cultural change happen? While it is not easy to pinpoint the specific motors of 
cultural change in societies (Tarrow 1989), our study suggests the importance of the interplay of the rise 
and fall of social movements (Ingram and Silverman 2016), economic factors (Vogel 1989), and media 
interpretations (Rao 1998) in fostering change in dominant beliefs and values. 
We also see our study as contributing methodologically to the field of organizational theory in 
three distinct ways. First, we offer an innovative approach to triangulate qualitative and quantitative 
content analysis by implementing a concurrent triangulation strategy (Creswell 2003). Second, we 
showcase a quantitative research design that bundles several methods to provide evidence for cross-level 
mechanisms (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Finally, we import advanced techniques from computer science 
to automatize the open problem about identifying the optimal number of topics when using topic 
modeling techniques (Arun et al. 2010; Deveaud et al. 2014; see Appendix A for more details).  These 
methods could be fruitfully applied to examine the robustness of our perspective on the firm/legal 
environment relationship over time (i.e., as an undulating battle for relative power influenced by cultural 
consonance) in analyzing modern-day questions.  
Consider the current situation regarding autonomous driving, i.e., the development of cars 
capable of sensing their environment and navigating without human input. The growing cultural 
consonance of autonomous driving as a fundamentally safer form of driving very recently saw a setback 
due to the first pedestrian death due to an autonomous car (Fitzgerald Rodriguez 2018; Matousek 2018). 
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Despite autonomous driving’s recent legalization in California, no automaker has yet applied for an 
autonomous driver permit, due in part to the loss of cultural consonance triggered by the unfortunate 
accident. There are certain situations in which we would expect our model of cultural consonance to be 
less applicable, e.g., when a technology is perceived as “high risk” or the assessment of its costs and 
benefits is riddled with technical challenges. An example in this regard is the nuclear power industry, 
which has one of the most contentious technologies in the U.S., and faces challenges in how experts seek 
to calculate the costs of operating a nuclear plant (Ross and Staw, 1993), and the dire and far reaching 
consequences of a potential accident (Perrow 1999). These factors combine to make the debate less 
susceptible to cultural contingencies, evidenced by the stall of nuclear investments in the late 1970s, with 
no new plants ordered since 1978 (Hultman and Koomey 2007). Even here, however, our theoretical 
framework could be adapted to analyze the cross-national (rather than cross-temporal) undulation in 
cultural consonance, e.g., comparing and contrasting the unfavorable situation for the nuclear power 
industry in the U.S. versus the more favorable reception in other countries, such as France. 
Finally, we wish to stress that our study’s emphasis on cultural context is not intended to suggest 
that more traditional political views on firms’ likely influence over their legal environments (e.g., 
business unity, access to considerable resources, and ties with elite politicians) do not matter. Rather, as 
noted earlier, we found that those factors were relevant throughout our period of study, and hence do not 
provide an explanation for the observed differences in firms’ success in these different periods. We 
encourage future research to build upon our cultural consonance perspective to show how and why 
culture matters in understanding firms’ actions and outcomes over time. At certain historical junctures, 
“new cultural complexes make possible new or reorganized strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986:282). Our 
study specifies how and why attaining greater cultural consonance between these new cultural complexes 
and firms’ strategies of action can change (at least temporarily) the balance of power between firms and 
their legal environment.   
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APPENDIX A – LDA and semantic network analysis preparation 
Automated Topic-Modeling Analysis 
Topic models are based upon the idea that documents are mixtures of topics and a topic is a 
probability distribution over words (Blei et al. 2003, Griffiths and Steyvers 2002, 2003, 2004, Hofmann 
2001, Hofmann and Thomas 1999, Steyvers and Griffiths 2007). A topic consists of a cluster of words 
that frequently occur together. A topic to the computer is composed as a list of words that occur in 
statistically meaningful ways. A text is every kind of unstructured text, i.e., that has no computer readable 
annotations telling the computer the semantic meaning of the words in the text. The advantage of topic 
modeling over other techniques used to capture content (e.g., word counts) is that it allows for 
polysemy—as words inductively can take on different meanings depending on their context. Topics thus 
emerge from the text, without the need to specify categories in advance. Using contextual clues, topic 
models can connect words with similar meanings and distinguish between the uses of words with multiple 
meanings (Steyvers and Griffiths 2007). Our automated analysis included three phases: text preparation, 
application of the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm to extract topics, and topic coding. 
Text preparation. We followed a standard procedure (Croidieu and Kim 2017) to prepare the raw 
text for topic-model analysis. First, we collected and converted all the input documents (84 annual 
reports, 25 congressional hearings, 950 newspaper articles—approximately 20,000 pages in total) into 
machine-readable files using commercial optical character recognition (OCR) software. The converted 
files where then manually checked and corrected to fix the errors of the automated procedure. Second, we 
transformed words into input tokens by removing punctuation and numbers, and separating them by 
spaces. Third, we applied a stemming procedure to automatically drop common suffixes (for instance –
ing, -s, etc.) to cluster words with a common root together (e.g. safety, safe, safer). Finally, we removed 
common stop-words, such as conjunctions, common adverbs, and rare words. 
Topic extraction. We employed the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm to identify topics 
(Blei 2012, Mohr and Bogdanov 2013). LDA uses the co-location of words in a collection of documents 
to infer the underlying (or latent) topics in those texts and each topic’s weight in each individual 
document. MALLET, a Java-based open-source NLP (Natural Language Processing) text analytics 
tool(McCallum 2002), was used to extract the topics from the set of available documents. MALLET uses 
a simple implementation of the Gibbs sampling algorithm, which considers each word as a token in the 
text collection and estimates the probability of assigning the word (or token) to each topic class 
conditional on the topic assignments to all other word tokens (Casella and George 1992). Each topic is 
assigned a score depending on the topic’s overall presence in the dataset.  
LDA requires to choose ex ante the number of topics T to extract, and how to identify the “right” 
number of topics to extract remains hotly debated. Indeed, Wallach et al. (2009) note that “selecting the 
number of topics T is one of the most problematic modeling choices in finite topic modeling” (p.7). A 
number of topics too small might generate sets of words that are too general, and thus not useful; too 
many topics might, on the other hand, extract topics that are very specific to specific documents, and thus 
not useful to understand general trends across the corpus (Marshall 2013). Indeed, the right number of 
topics is corpus specific, as each corpus has a unique size and a specific content scope (for instance, our 
corpus was quite focused given our interest in auto safety). As a matter of reference, in the 2013 special 
issue of Poetics dedicated to topic modeling, the number of topics generated by each article ranged from 
12 to 500. 
 To identify the most meaningful T to fit our data, we started by extracting 20 topics – the 
recommended default option in MALLET. We then manually compared the topic extraction with 
alternative models of 15 and 25 models, evaluating the quality of information gained (lost) by the 
marginal addition (removal) of topics. Past research on the “right” number of topics in a corpus (Arun et 
al., 2010) concluded that the correct number of topics must be a “small range that gives the best accuracy 
on a held out dataset” (Arun et al., 2010, p. 392), implicitly stating that, since the topics in topic modeling 
are generative, the choice must be human-assisted.  
To check for the correctness of the assumed range of topics chosen, we used two metrics 
introduced by Arun et al. (2010) and Deveaud et al. (2014). The measure developed by Arun et al. (2010) 
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considers LDA as a matrix factorization method which factorizes a document-word frequency matrix M 
into two matrices M1 (of order T * W) and M2 (of order D * W) in which T is the number of topics, W is 
the size of the vocabulary, and D the number of documents in the corpus. The measure computes the 
symmetric Kullback-Leibler divergence of the SVD (Singular Value Decomposition) of matrix M1 and 
the distribution of the vector L * M2, where L is a 1 * D vector containing the lengths of each document 
in the corpus. Arun et al. (2010) demonstrated that, at the optimal number of topics, these distributions are 
comparable. Accordingly, the divergence between these distributions will be the lowest in the case of the 
“right” number of topics (in our case using 20 or 25 topics). The measure by Deveaud et al. (2014) uses 
“concepts” in order to recreate the conceptual view of the original stream of information. The underlying 
assumption of the algorithm is that all the documents are essentially dealing with the same topics (no 
matter what the T is); therefore, concepts that are more likely to appear improve the probability to find the 
“right” number of topics, while noisy concepts are not. Finally, the measure estimates the similarity 
between every pair of concept models, and the maximum redundancy between two sets of concepts gives 
the optimum number of topics to use. Again, the results suggest to use either 20 or 25 topics as the perfect 
fit for the data and, after manual inspection of the results, we confirmed our decision to use 20 topics 
considering the difference between the two choices not significant enough. 
 
Figure 1. Optimal number of topics.  
 
 
Following Giorgi and Weber (2015), we decided to label our 20 topics with unique titles to better 
contextualize each topic. We decided to discard 5 topics as they pertained to the release of financial 
information in the annual reports, leaving us with a set of 15 topics reported in Table 3 in the main text. 
Finally, each document in our corpus was then assigned a score for each topic (between 0 and 1), 
resulting in a 15-dimensional vector. This step allowed us to stochastically estimate the likelihood of each 
topic appearing in each document, thus permitting an analysis of the topics’ emergence and diffusion over 
time and across stakeholder groups.  
Topic coding. As our qualitative analysis revealed two major rivalling conceptualizations of auto 
safety across our data period, we decided to classify our 15 topics as pertaining to either the “safety as 
design” or “safety as cost-benefit” conceptualization (Marshall 2013). Two coders classified all the topics 
independently, reaching an 87% agreement. The remaining topics were classified after a joint resolution. 
The final results of the topic modeling analysis are reported in Figures 3a–3c in the paper. 
Network-Text Analysis 
We applied network text analysis on the automakers’ annual reports to capture changes in their 
symbolic framing. To do so, we first selected all the paragraphs including the word “safety” in their 
annual reports. We then cleaned our textual data by removing stop words (Luhn 1959) and using the 
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Porter stemming procedure (Porter 1980) – two widely employed methods for standardizing and filtering 
texts. Stop words are the most common words that are used to connect concepts in a language, such as 
conjunctions and adverbs. Stemming is a reduction process of a word’s inflected form to its root form, 
which removes all the prefixes and suffixes that express tense, case, voice, aspect, person, number, gender 
and mood. Finally, we created a thesaurus to ensure that synonyms were considered jointly during the 
analysis (Carley et al. 2013).  
The network text analysis was performed using the AutoMap software package (Carley et al. 
2013), which generates semantic networks: nodes are concepts and ties represent how frequently two 
linked concepts co-occur within a specific text window. We set this window to a distance of plus or minus 
three words within a sentence. For instance, the concepts “safety” and “cost” would have a link value of 5 
if they co-occurred 5 times within said set window in a specific corpus of text. The value of a tie thus 
represents the strength of association between two concepts. Network text analysis thus provides insights 
into how concepts are used in relation to one another. We used this technique to reveal how automakers 
(a) employed different safety-related concepts and (b) changed these semantic associations over time. 
Given our focus, we displayed the ego-networks of “safety” (i.e., the associations of “safety” with other 
concepts) and displayed only the strongest (most frequent) associations among concepts. We chose a 
visualization threshold based on relative frequency (Carley et al. 2013), thus only showing the co-
occurrences that appeared in the text a number of times over 20% of the highest value of any frequency. 
For instance, in Figure 2c, given a highest value of 60, we displayed links among concepts that appeared 
at least 12 times for the given period. As such, the displayed associations featured in Figures 2a–2c are 
only highly frequent co-occurrences. To further simplify the interpretation of the maps, we circled cluster 
of words related to theoretical concepts. We have done so by mixing a qualitative reading with a 
clustering analysis performed using UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002). 
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Table 1. Summary of data sources. 
 
Source Database Time period  
   
(1) Congressional Hearings LexisNexis Congressional  
 
1965–1980  
 
(2) Annual reports (General Motors, 
Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors) 
ProQuest Historical Annual 
Reports 
1965–1980  
 
   
(3) Advertising (General Motors, Ford, 
Chrysler, American Motors, BMW, 
Mercedes, Volvo, Saab, Honda and 
Toyota) 
Car magazines such as Road and 
Track, Car and Driver, and 
Motor Trend (in print) 
1965–1980 
   
(4) Audio recordings of Nixon Oval 
Office meetings with automobile 
executives 
 
Nixon Presidential Library and 
Museum  
1971 
 
(5) NHTSA’s regulatory analyses and 
interpretation letters 
 
NHTSA’s online archive 1965–1980 
(6) Congressional reports LexisNexis Congressional 
Database, library 
 
1965–1980  
(7) Newspaper articles (The New York 
Times, The Wall Street Journal, The 
Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, 
Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times) 
 
ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers, library indices of 
The New York Times and The 
Wall Street Journal  
1965–1980 
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Table 2. Main chronology, 1965-1980. 
 
Year Event 
1965 Ralph Nader publishes his book Unsafe at Any Speed, in which he criticizes the Chevrolet Corvair's inherent design 
defects and blames the auto industry for millions of deaths. 
1966 The National Academy of Sciences publishes a report entitled "Accidental Death and Disability: The Neglected Disease 
of Modern Society." 
 The New Republic publishes the story about GM’s private investigations and harassment of Ralph Nader; Unsafe at Any 
Speed becomes an overnight bestseller. 
 James Roche, president of GM, publicly apologizes to Congress. 
 President Johnson signs the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966; a new administrative agency—the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Bureau (NHTSB)—is established under the U.S. Department of Transportation to carry 
out safety programs under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Highway Safety Act of 
1966. 
 Dr. William Haddon, an epidemiologist by training, becomes NHTSB’s first administrator. 
1967 NHTSB issues the first 30 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), including a mandate governing door latch 
strength and mandatory fitting of front seatbelts. 
1968 NHTSB makes seat belts a required feature in all new U.S. vehicles starting in the 1968 model year. 
1969 President Nixon takes office. 
 GM stops manufacturing the Chevrolet Corvair. 
1970 NHTSA is officially established to replace the National Highway Safety Bureau. 
 NHTSA amends Standard 208 on “Occupant Crash Protection,” one of the original FMVSS to "upgrade the 
requirements of 1974 and 1975 models.” The requirements for this amendment are "significantly" changed before taking 
effect. 
 Ford introduces its first Pinto model. 
Congress passes the Occupational Health and Safety Act and Clean Air Act Amendments. 
Volvo runs "It shouldn't take an act of Congress to make cars safe" advertising campaign. 
1971 Ford builds an experimental airbag fleet. 
1972 President Nixon signs the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act with strong bumper requirements. 
 NHTSA introduces changes to Standard 208: the manufacturers are given three options for compliance under the 
standard: (a) a totally passive system, (b) the existing lap/shoulder system with a warning device, and (c) an intermediate 
system. Standard 208 is modified further to require ignition interlocks for the lap/shoulder belt system on 1973 and 
subsequent models. 
1973 NHTSA mandates fitting of seatbelts with ignition interlocks. 
 The Federal Aid Highway Act passes. 
 This year marks the height of oil crisis (Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act). 
 GM builds experimental airbag fleet on Chevrolet vehicles. 
1974 President Ford takes office. 
 A countrywide 55 MPH fuel-saving speed limit is imposed. 
 The law requiring seatbelt-ignition interlocks is revoked. 
 GM first offers an airbag option. 
 The oil embargo is lifted. 
 Standard 208 is altered; the requirement for ignition interlocks for the lap/shoulder belt is rescinded ("Because of public 
reaction"). 
1975 The Vietnam War ends. 
 The 55 MPH fuel-saving speed limit is made permanent. 
1976 President Ford signs the Federal-Aid Highway Amendments. 
 New NHTSA administrator Joan Claybrook issues new standards to improve frontal crash protection, such as the 
installation of air bags and automatic belts, to prevent tampering with odometers and to extend steering column 
protections to vans and light trucks. 
 NHTSA’s Associate Administrator Robert Carter reports that he has ordered the abandonment of a 1971 proposal to 
require the installation of rear under-ride guards on trucks after a cost-benefit analysis predicts that the costs will exceed 
the benefits.  
1977 President Carter takes office. 
 Mandatory airbag or automatic seatbelt regulations are reinstated, starting in the 1984 model year. 
 Mother Jones Magazine publishes "Pinto Madness: For seven years the Ford Motor Company sold cars in which it knew 
hundreds of people would needlessly burn to death." 
1978 Ford recalls 1.5 million Ford Pintos. 
1979 Second oil crisis (in the wake of the Iranian Revolution) begins. 
1980 NHTSA adopts cost-benefit ratio requirements for each new safety standard (the device, system, or design feature may 
not be made mandatory unless it will save more money, e.g., in property damage or health care, than it costs, or must not 
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cost more than a specified amount of money per life saved). 
 Ford goes through criminal trial and is charged with reckless homicide in the deaths of three Indiana teenagers who were 
killed when their Ford Pinto was hit from behind. 
 Ford stops manufacturing the Pinto. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Topics extracted by topic modeling analysis (1965-1980). 
 
Topic Weight Topic label Top topic words 
 TOPICS RELATED TO “SAFETY AS DESIGN” 
    
1 0.30 New regulations for safety, 
health and environment 
chairman standards statement public congress federal safety 
questions 
2 0.19 Increased role of federal 
government in safety regulation 
public federal states national programs highway law action study 
committee authority 
3 0.46 Role of engineering and testing 
in increasing safety 
research motors safety engineering improved development systems 
progress control design 
4 0.03 Importance of design to increase 
safety 
safety vehicle seat cars research motor standards driver design 
accidents steering 
5 0.26 Consumers’ push for safer 
products 
safety consumer product federal commission Nader standards 
industry congress 
6 0.03 Monitoring of car defects safety tire motor information defects car inspection 
7 0.53 Public/private relations and 
balance of power 
industry government work committee report problem action result 
 TOPICS RELATED TO “COST-BENEFIT” 
    
8 0.05 Cost/benefit of government and 
federal regulations 
regulations NHTSA costs benefits agencies government EPA control 
price coal health fuel capital model analysis 
9 0.04 Reform of the regulatory process 
to increase efficiency 
administrative agencies law congress regulations process review 
rulemaking judges committee veto rules 
10 0.02 Criticism of NHTSA standards standard vehicle safety NHTSA system equipment manufacturers 
requirements highway stopping systems 
11 0.04 Introduction of the Highway 
Safety Act 
safety traffic standards vehicle highway accidents driver research 
federal government 
12 0.11 Data requirements for 
implementing cost-effective 
regulations 
standard bumper speed safety cost data crash damage systems test 
study analysis impact 
13 0.24 Increase in costs and gasoline 
prices 
industry economy fuel car sales automobile energy market price 
percent increase gasoline general cost 
14 0.03 Cost of car repairs  repair consumer vehicle service inspection warranty diagnostic cost 
mechanics industry 
15 0.06 Passive restraints in 
automobiles/airbag standards 
airbag passive restraint belt safety seat system insurance injury 
protection 
Note: Topics were extracted on the complete text corpus comprised of Congressional Hearings, Annual Reports and 
Newspapers articles, 1965-1980. 
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Figure 1. Costs of NHTSA-mandated safety features per passenger car, 1965–1980 
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Figure 2a. Automakers’ symbolic associations with “safety”, first phase (1965-1966)
 
 
Figure 2b. Automakers’ symbolic associations with “safety”, second phase (1967-1 972)
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Figure 2c. Automakers’ symbolic associations with “safety”, third phase (1973-1980)
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Figure 3a. Likelihood of the appearance of “safety-as-design” topics by phase across key 
actors, 1967–1972 vs. 1973-1980 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. Likelihood of the appearance of “safety as cost benefit” topics by phase across 
key actors, 1967-1972 vs. 1973–1980 
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Figure 3c. Comparison of topic prevalence in Congressional Hearings, 1965–1980 
	
 
 
 
Figure 4. Frequencies of “auto safety” and “cost benefit analysis” n-grams in published 
sources, 1965–1980 
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Figure 5. A model of the balance of power between firms and the legal environment as contingent on cultural context 
 
 
